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Abstract I.106Full Paper + Presentation
Safety Case Management in the United Kingdom Offshore Industry - Verification of Safety and Environmental Critical Elements, and risk management through predictive Bow Ties.
This paper outlines the development and use of a new variation of Bow Tie modelling which incorporates live operational data (corrective and planned interventions) from Computerised Maintenance Management Systems (CMMS) into Bayesian Learning processes. This variation provides longer term probabilistic risk management analyses hence allowing the early scoping of interventions to mitigate future predicted "As Low As Reasonably Practicable" (ALARP) impairments. This provides proof to the Competent Authority that risks are being proactively managed based on Asset Specific performance data.
Why this is necessary?
In the United Kingdom, the safety management of offshore oil and gas production installations is primarily governed by the Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.) Regulations 2015. The adoption of the Safety Case regime was a key outcome of the Cullen Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988. The Safety Case is a comprehensive document that demonstrates the Duty Holder has identified all major accident hazards, assessed the risks, put in place adequate control measures and management systems to manage these risks. These actions effectively reduce risks to ALARP. It is a condition of operation that the Safety Case is accepted by the Competent Authority.
A key aspect of the Safety Case is the provision of a "suitable and sufficient" Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for ALARP demonstration. The Competent Authority therefore requires strong justification for assumptions and handling uncertainties in the QRA, with the expectation of clear, self-contained arguments supported by data. Traditionally, these QRA analyses are based on industry wide data as opposed to Asset Specific Data.
Duty holders must review their Safety Cases at least every five years, or whenever a material change occurs that could affect major accident prevention. In the intervening period, a verification process (as outlined in the Safety Case) is employed whereby an Independent Competent Person (ICPs) is appointed to confirm that an installation's Safety and Environmental Critical Elements (SECE’s) are suitable and dependable throughout their life cycle. Therefore, ensuring major accident risks are controlled as described in the operator's Safety Case.
The frequency for the verification of SECE’s is not set by a single universal table or regulatory body. It is determined by the specific operator as part of their Safety Case. The frequency depends on the scale, size, and risk profile of the facility and its equipment.
However, the review of Safety Cases and the SECE verification processes are in fact “snap shots in time” of individual Equipment Item performance. This fails to take into consideration the implications of their system wide (or individual Barrier) impacts on Hazard Management, or in the provision of longer-term predictive analyses thus enabling proactive risk management.
To address these very issues, and others related to suitable and sufficient QRA’s, this paper outlines how SECE’s can be modelled in series/parallel configurations and enabling probabilistic and predictive analyses.
← Check another abstractWhy this is necessary?
In the United Kingdom, the safety management of offshore oil and gas production installations is primarily governed by the Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.) Regulations 2015. The adoption of the Safety Case regime was a key outcome of the Cullen Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988. The Safety Case is a comprehensive document that demonstrates the Duty Holder has identified all major accident hazards, assessed the risks, put in place adequate control measures and management systems to manage these risks. These actions effectively reduce risks to ALARP. It is a condition of operation that the Safety Case is accepted by the Competent Authority.
A key aspect of the Safety Case is the provision of a "suitable and sufficient" Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for ALARP demonstration. The Competent Authority therefore requires strong justification for assumptions and handling uncertainties in the QRA, with the expectation of clear, self-contained arguments supported by data. Traditionally, these QRA analyses are based on industry wide data as opposed to Asset Specific Data.
Duty holders must review their Safety Cases at least every five years, or whenever a material change occurs that could affect major accident prevention. In the intervening period, a verification process (as outlined in the Safety Case) is employed whereby an Independent Competent Person (ICPs) is appointed to confirm that an installation's Safety and Environmental Critical Elements (SECE’s) are suitable and dependable throughout their life cycle. Therefore, ensuring major accident risks are controlled as described in the operator's Safety Case.
The frequency for the verification of SECE’s is not set by a single universal table or regulatory body. It is determined by the specific operator as part of their Safety Case. The frequency depends on the scale, size, and risk profile of the facility and its equipment.
However, the review of Safety Cases and the SECE verification processes are in fact “snap shots in time” of individual Equipment Item performance. This fails to take into consideration the implications of their system wide (or individual Barrier) impacts on Hazard Management, or in the provision of longer-term predictive analyses thus enabling proactive risk management.
To address these very issues, and others related to suitable and sufficient QRA’s, this paper outlines how SECE’s can be modelled in series/parallel configurations and enabling probabilistic and predictive analyses.