Advanced reactor platforms present a unique challenge for regulatory decision-making[SM1.1]. Unlike existing LLWRs, these advanced reactors may come in many sizes, have unique missions and operational environments, rely on different plant physics models, output different levels of energy, and operate in fundamentally different ways than existing commercial reactor designs. Advanced reactors therefore represent a diverse range of technologies that may: rely on simpler designs, use design features that make them “inherently” safe, use higher levels of automation, and may not have a traditional Main Control Room (MCR) or concept of operations (ConOps).
These characteristics have implications for staffing, training, qualifications, operator actions, human-system interface (HSI) designs, and procedures. It also provides a unique challenge to how risk analyses and potential human errors are quantified and managed in nuclear power facilities. Specifically, the Final 10 CFR § 53.410(b) states:
Corresponding human actions and programmatic controls must be identified and implemented in accordance with this and other subparts to achieve and maintain the reliability and capability of SSCs relied upon to satisfy the defined functional design criteria and the safety criteria required in § 53.210, and to maintain consistency with analyses required by § 53.450(f).
This paper will discuss what impacts that a more flexible and broadly applicable definition of Important Human Actions (IHAs) means for reactor developers, regulators, and risk analysts.