



PSAM 18 · Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management


A Traceable AI-Agent Operation Framework Using Graph-Based Procedures in Nuclear Abnormal Scenario Simulation

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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania · July 19-24, 2026

Why Is This Hard for Nuclear Operators?

In safety-critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plants, when an abnormal event occurs, operators respond by reading dense, text-based procedures.



This 4-step cycle has to be repeated by a human, over and over, under time pressure.

Even reading the same procedure, different operators can interpret it differently

Where Does Existing Research Stand?

Computer-Based Procedures

e.g., Rancor, RIPS

- Display procedures and plant states
- Track procedural progress

→ **Procedure execution support**

AI-Based Operator Support

e.g., COSS, NAMAC

- Diagnose and predict system conditions
- Recommend mitigation actions

→ **Recommendation quality**

Limited action-level traceability connecting each AI-selected action to its procedure context, validation result, and resulting state change.

BuildLink: Graph-Based Decision Support

BuildLink structures procedures and incident reports as **knowledge graphs** for AI-based retrieval.

1

Procedure Knowledge Graph

Converts text procedures into explicit 'condition-state-action' relationships

2

Incident Knowledge Graph

Structures 600+ NRC Licensee Event Reports (LERs) into components, causes, outcomes, and human actions


3

GraphRAG Advisor

Retrieves related procedure and incident evidence from the current state and user query

✂ In BuildLink, AI supported human operators as an **advisor**.


Linking Procedures and Incidents



→ An operator can move directly from a procedure step to a related past incident and back again.

PREVIOUS WORK

BuildLink Interface



Control Panel

- Monitor control states
- Manipulate control elements

CONTROL PANEL

02:11

REACTOR

TRIP REACTOR

SI OFF

RCP ON

PORV CLOSE

STEAM GENERATOR

FWP ON

FWIV OPEN

MSIV OPEN

FW CONTROL

AUTO 100%

TURBINE

TRIP TURBINE

TSCV 100%

TLCV 100%

TBCV 100%

TEN ON

RESTART

LOGS

AI ADVISOR (GRAPHRAG)

HELLO.

We currently have active alarms: FW_LOW_FLOW and SG_LOW_LEVEL.

Current system state:

- FW Flow: 0.4 L/s
- SG Level: 14.3 %

Please proceed with STEP 11 to address the Feedwater Low Flow condition.

What should I do in the current step?

Based on the active 'FW_LOW_FLOW' alarm and a 'FW Flow' of '0.0 L/s', you should proceed with the following action:

Turn the Feedwater Control Valve into Manual Mode.

Ask Advisor

SEND

PROCEDURES / KG

STEP 2.3

INCIDENT VIEW

AUTO-FOCUS: OFF

96 NODES

Legend:


- Step
- Logic
- Controller
- Indicator
- Incident
- Feature

PREVIOUS STEP

Wait for Decision...

TRUE FALSE

CORE T HIGH	SI ENGAGED	RODS DOWN
RCP TRIP	SG HI LEVEL	SG LO LEVEL
FW LO FLOW	FW PUMP TRIP	TURBINE TRIP



REACTOR

TRIP REACTOR

SI OFF RCP ON PORV CLOSE

STEAM GENERATOR

FWP ON FWV OPEN MSV OPEN

FW CONTROL

Auto

TURBINE

TRIP TURBINE

TSDV 100% TSDV 100% TSDV 100% TSDV 100%

HELLO,

We currently have active alarms: FW_LO_FLOW and SG_LO_LEVEL.

Current system state:

- FW Flow: 0.4 L/s
- SG Level: 14.3 %

Please

Status Panel

- Alarm status
- Indicator values
- System schematic



From Text Procedure to Knowledge Graph



Step 2.3 Check if the Feedwater Flow has been restored


If the Feedwater Flow has been restored

- End procedure

If the Feedwater Flow had not been restored

- Go to step 3.1





AI Advisor

- Query-based support
- Graph evidence retrieval
- Evidence IDs and session logs

AI ADVISOR (GRAPHRAG)

ONLINE

Hello.

We currently have active alarms: FW_LOW_FLOW and SG_LOW_LEVEL.

Current system state:

- FW Flow: 0.4 L/s
- SG Level: 14.3 %

Please proceed with STEP 1.1 to address the Feedwater Low Flow condition.

User

What should I do in the current step?

AI

Based on the active 'FW_LOW_FLOW' alarm and a 'FW Flow' of '0.0 L/s', you should proceed with the following action:


Turn the Feedwater Control Valve into Manual Mode.

Ask Advisor...

SEND

PROCEDURES / KG STEP 2.3

INCIDENT VIEW AUTO-FOCUS: OFF 96 NODES



- Step
- Logic
- Controller
- Indicator
- Incident
- Feature

PREVIOUS STEP

Wait for Decision...

TRUE

FALSE

From AI Advisor to AI Actor

BuildLink (Prior Work)

AI = Advisor

AI only **'presents'** procedure & incident evidence, final judgment & action remain with the **human**

→ Explaining 'why this answer' is enough

This Study

AI = Actor

AI directly **'selects and executes'** actions the simulator state actually **changes**

→ Also record 'why this action, in this state'

Key question : A scenario's final success or failure alone tells us nothing about why the AI took a given action, or how it connects to the procedure.

*How can AI-agent actions in nuclear abnormal operations
be constrained and recorded as an analyzable decision path?*

Constrain

Limit actions to a predefined
action space


Validate

Check procedure context
and simulator rules

Log


Record actions, validation,
and state transitions

How the Framework Works



Every action is logged with its procedure context, validation result, and pre/post state.

From State Interpretation to Decision-Path Logging



Nothing reaches the simulator unvalidated.

Candidate actions are held until validated, enabling a split between accepted sequences and rejected attempts.

Defining a Human-Interpretable Action Space

AI actions are limited by action type, target, and value range.

Too Fine-Grained

Mouse clicks
Raw variable writes

Action-Level Unit

Start / stop a component
Adjust a control valve
Select a branch
Advance a step

Too Coarse

One action
per procedure step

Human-readable and directly executable

Prototype: 25 predefined actions

DECISION-PATH LOGGING SCHEMA

Decision-Path Log Contents

Logged Information	Examples
Context	Time, procedure step
Action	Type, target, value
Validation	Accepted/rejected, reason
State Transition	State before and after
Agent Explanation	Supporting information only

⌘ Reasoning is only auxiliary information. The primary basis for analysis is the evidence chain: procedure context → validation result → state transition.

Prototype Verification: Scale & Results

99

Graph nodes

85

Graph edges

25

Action definitions

2 / 4

Accepted / Rejected

Representative log entries (excerpt)

Procedure Step	Proposed Action	Result	Reason / State Transition
Step 1.1	advance_procedure	✓ Accepted	current_step changed to Step 1.2
Step 1.2	trip_reactor	✗ Rejected	Not linked to current procedure context
Step 2.2	feedwater valve = 1	✓ Accepted	feedwater_control_valve changed to 1
Step 2.2	feedwater valve = 1.5	✗ Rejected	Value must be between 0 and 1
Step 2.3	branch select = FALSE	✗ Rejected	No valid graph transition found

Current Scope & Future Work

- 1 Extended BuildLink's procedure knowledge graph into a constraint on AI-agent execution
- 2 Reconstructable as an action-level Decision-Path Log, not just final success/failure
- 3 The core is an evidence chain: procedure context → validation result → state transition

Current Scope

- Initial prototype focused on framework feasibility
- Validation depends on the available procedure graph and action definitions
- Agent reasoning is used as supporting information

Future Work

- Refine action definitions and validation constraints
- Add a human review interface for accept/reject decisions
- Explore incident-knowledge integration and dynamic HRA frameworks

Thank You

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Carnegie Mellon University · Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Acknowledgements

Pennsylvania Infrastructure Technology Alliance (PITA)

CUAHSI Hydroinformatics Innovation Fellowship (NSF EAR-1849458)

Chishiki-AI SCIPe Graduate Fellowship (NSF 2321040)



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