

PSAM 18 Conference



Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Human Actions in Emergency Management at an SMR Multi-Unit Site

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1. Research motivation
2. Objectives and Methodology
3. Identification of Human Actions for the On-site Emergency Management Plan
4. Probabilistic Modelling of HAs and HFEs
5. Application case: Results
6. Conclusions




Figure 1: Bariloche Atomic Center – CNEA - location.






1. Research motivation


New nuclear power plant designs



New challenges!



Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)




Multi-unit or multi-module sites




Figure 2: Image extracted from The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, IAEA, 2015


Human Factors Engineering (HFEN)



On-site Emergency Management Plan



HUMAN ACTIONS (HAs)





2. Objectives and Methodology

Objectives

1. To define a structure of HAs involved in emergency plan management for a multi-unit site with SMR units.
2. To define guidelines for modelling HAs within a dynamic probabilistic model that supports emergency management plan development

Methodology

- Literature reviews → No references regarding HA identification and modelling in on-site emergency management
- Literature reviews → Thematic descomposition
- Propose of methodological approaches
- Application case: Hypothetical multi-unit site with two i-PWR SMRs.





3. Identification of Human Actions for On-site Emergency Management Plan




Figure: HA structure for on-site emergency management.

Figure 3: Relationships among HAs for on-site emergency management.





4. Probabilistic Modelling of HAs and Human Failure Events

Framework

- Probabilistic model to support design on-site emergency management plan → Dynamic probabilistic model

Type of human action

- Post-initiated HAs
- Strategies: Control of Initiating event, FLEX, Severe accident management

Methods & tools

- SPAR-H (RiskSpectrum HRA)
- EMRALD

Scope

- Static Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) → standardized by type of HA
- No delays considered in HA
- Dependences: First approach → only information transfer among organizational structure. Definition of Dependency types. Evaluated according to SPAR-H.




Figure 4: Proposed dependency types.





4. Probabilistic Modelling of HAs and Human Failure Events: EMRALD

EMRALD modules




Figure: Proposed modules for the EMRALD model.

Hypothetical case study




Figure 5: Hypothetical case study.

Flex strategy




Figure 6: Organizational structure for emergency management in the hypothetical case study.



5. Application case: Results

HA identification

- HA identification for FLEX strategy according to HAs structure.

Modelling of identified HAs

- Modelling of HAs required for complex actions required for assigning a shared system in a multi-unit site (Site HA, Unit HA, System HA).

Evaluation of Human Error Probabilities (HEP)

- HFE asociated to each HA
- Selected PSF: Available time, Complexity, Stress/stressors, Ergonomics/HMI
- Dependency: Moderate (based in hypotheses)
- HEP ~ 4×10^{-1} (Flex strategy)


EMRALD Model

- Proposed an structure of modules.
- Definition of methodological aspects (eg. Variable definitions).
- Coherent results for application case.



Figure 7: EMRALD model. HAs linked to strategy.

Final States




Coherent results!





6. Conclusions



Thank you for your attention!



Questions?

