



A Short Introduction to HUNTER: Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability

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• We've divided HUNTER into five topics

- Introduction Ron Boring
- Task Module (= Procedures) Tom Ulrich
- Environment Module (= RELAP5-3D Interface) Yun Heo
- Individual Module (= Performance Shaping Factors) Jooyoung Park
- Graphical User Interface Jeeyea Ahn

Represents work primarily from the period Summer 2021 – Spring 2022





HUNTER Origins



HUNTER: Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability


- A *unimodel* is a cognitive framework that favors simplified decision models
- The HUNTER name is a tongue-incheek reference to many of the INL animal-named modeling and simulation codes
 - HUNTER is the human element coupled to the hardware model, e.g., MOOSE-HUNTER or RAVEN-HUNTER
 - We disavow any reference to harming the animal-named codes we work with of course! ⁽³⁾





• HUNTER Introduced at PSAM in Korea

- Goal: Create a dynamic version of SPAR-H
- Develop simple, easy-to-use dynamic HRA as proof of concept
 - Stepping stone to more complete dynamic HRA methods like ADS-IDAC
- Framework required many parts beyond SPAR-H





- Context for HUNTER
 - Origins were in creating a dynamic version of one of the simplest HRA methods, SPAR-H
 - Dynamic HRA and PRA have not been widely adapted
 - The approaches are necessarily complex
 - They have been slow to become releasable software tools
 - A lot of research needed just to get them going
 - The tools have successfully answered many research questions but have not translated into widespread use
 - If we can create the right tools, dynamic HRA has strong advantages over static HRA
 - Modeling what-if scenarios that are not possible in static HRA
 - Modeling more realistic contexts and event progressions
 - Providing coupled data between plant models and human models
 - Providing new metrics beyond HEPs
 - E.g., HUNTER calculates time on task in addition to HEPs




Original HUNTER Addressed Three Main Concepts

Concept	Purpose
GOMS-HRA	Taxonomy of task-level primitives that can be paired to
	operating procedures to provide base error rates and
	timing for each human action
PSF	Calculate modifiers on HEPs based on objective plant
Autocalculation	conditions that realistically change over an event
Dynamic	Method to aggregate HEPs across multiple tasks for
Dependency	backwards compatibility to static HRA



GOMS-HRA

- GOMS (Goals-Operators-Methods-Selection rules) was method developed to support task analysis
- GOMS-HRA is INL method to develop a taxonomy of basic elements of human performance



Term	Abbreviation	Definition					
Task Level Primitive	TLP	A basic human operation occurring at the subtask level. Multiple operations are typically required to achieve specific actions and goals.					
Procedure Level Primitive	PLP	A human activity occurring at the procedure step level. Often, multiple task level primitives will be required to achieve a procedure level primitive activity.					
Task Level Error	TLE	A nominal human error associated with a task level primitive. Each task level primitives is associated with multiple possible task level errors.					



Original HUNTER Elements

• GOMS-HRA

 GOMS Task Level Primitives provide basic error rates, calibrated to THERP or SPAR-H

Operator	Description	Nominal HEP	THERP Source	Notes
A _C	Performing required physical actions on the control boards	0.001	20-12 (3)	Assume well- delineated controls
\mathbf{A}_{F}	Performing required physical actions in the field	0.008	20-13 (4)	Assume series of controls
C _C	Looking for required information on the control boards	0.001	20-9 (3)	Assume well- delineated indicators
$C_{\rm F}$	Looking for required information in the field	0.01	20-14 (4)	Assume unclear indication
R _C	Obtaining required information on the control boards	0.001	20-9 (3)	Assume well- delineated indicators
$R_{\rm F}$	Obtaining required information in the field	0.01	20-14 (4)	Assume unclear indication
I _P	Producing verbal or written instructions	0.003	20-5 (1)	Assume omit a step
I _R	Receiving verbal or written instructions	0.001	20-8 (1)	Assume recall one item
Sc	Selecting or setting a value on the control boards	0.001	20-12 (9)	Assume rotary style control
$S_{\rm F}$	Selecting or setting a value in the field	0.008	20-13 (4)	Assume series of controls
D _P	Making a decision based on procedures	0.001	20-3 (4)	Assume 30- minute rule
D_{W}	Making a decision without available procedures	0.01	20-1 (4)	Assume 30- minute rule



• GOMS-HRA

- GOMS also provides nominal timing data in addition to human error probabilities
- Derived from studies conducted in INL's Human Systems Simulation Laboratory

Task-Level Primitive	Distribution	Mean (log scale)	Standard Deviation (log scale)	5 th Percentile	95 th Percentile
A _C	Lognormal	2.23	1.18	1.32	65.30
C _c	Lognormal	2.14	0.76	2.44	29.90
D _P	Exponential	0.02	N/A	2.62	152.80
IP	Lognormal	2.46	0.76	3.35	40.70
I _R	Lognormal	1.92	0.93	1.47	31.80
R _C	Lognormal	2.11	0.60	3.08	21.90
Sc	Lognormal	2.93	1.11	3.01	115.60
W	Lognormal	2.66	1.26	1.79	113.60



Original HUNTER Elements

• GOMS-HRA


 GOMS Task Level Errors map common types of errors that occur

TLP	Task Level Errors
A	TLE-A1: Failure to execute desired action
	TLE-A2: Execute desired action incorrectly
С	TLE-C1: Wrong information checked
	TLE-C2: Information missed
	TLE-C3: Information misinterpreted
	TLE-C4: Failure to check information
R	TLE-R1: Information not attended to
	TLE-R2: Information not perceived
	TLE-R3: Information misinterpreted
IP	TLE-IP1: Failure to produce desired communication
	TLE-IP2: Failure to produce correct communication
I _R	TLE-IR1: Communication not attended to
	TLE-IR2: Communication not perceived
	TLE-IR3: Communication misinterpreted
S	TLE-S1: Failure to select
	TLE-S2: Selection make incorrectly
D	TLE-D1: Incorrect goals or priorities
	TLE-D2: Incorrect use of information
	TLE-D3: Incorrect mental model
W	TLE-W1: Incorrect inaction
	TLE-W2: Waiting too long
	TLE-W3: Waiting too short



• Autocalculation of SPAR-H Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs)

- Use plant parameters to calculate influence of PSF on the nominal error rate
- PSF is calculated without analyst intervention






Original HUNTER Framework

HUNTER Mapping of Dynamic Dependency

- Dynamic HRA consists of continuous not discrete action sequences
- Traditional static ways of calculating discrete human error probabilities (HEPs) for human failure events (HFEs) may not carry over to dynamic models



Time (min)



• HUNTER Mapping of Dynamic Dependency

- What are the effects of one task on another?
- PSFs do not just turn on and off; they lag and linger

Dynamic PSF Function	Effect on PSF	Notation
lag	A PSF will be slow to change at	$PSF(t_{i+1}) = \lim_{t \to t_{i+1}} PSF(t)$
lag	the outset of a new effect	$t \rightarrow t_{i+1}$
	A PSF will be slow to change at	
linger	the termination of an existing	$PSF(t_{i+1}) = \lim_{t \to t_{i+1}} PSF(t)$
	effect	
	General form of lag and linger,	
momory	denoting that the effect of the	DSE(t) = f(t)
memory	current PSF is a function of	$PSF(t_{i+1}) = f(t_i)$
	preceding values for that PSF	
docav	A PSF will settle to its original	$DSE(t) = DSE(0)$ for $t \gg t$
decay	state over time	$PSF(t) = PSF(0) for \ t \gg t_N$




New HUNTER Developments





- The Original HUNTER was a Disparate Collection of Research Tools
- A Review of the Technology Readiness Level of HUNTER Suggested These Parts Were Mature, but the Overall Tool Was Not Complete
 - HUNTER needs to be developed as a standalone software program
 - HUNTER needs to have a library of analyses
 - Addressing these issues will help make HUNTER a useful tool for human reliability analysts





Toward HUNTER 2.0

• New HUNTER Developments

- Captured in report released by DOE LWRS in March 2022
- Includes refined overall framework
- Standalone software
 - Emphasis on simplified graphical user interface that promotes ease of use
- New use case to demonstrate capabilities
- Clear delineation between HUNTER dynamic HRA and dynamic PRA software like EMRALD

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program

Software Implementation and Demonstration of the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER)



March 2022

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy



Software Architecture Emphasizes Adaptability

- Flexible
 - HUNTER should be able to model a variety of applications
 - From main control room to balance of plant
 - Much of the advantage of dynamic HRA may be realized in areas not yet captured by static HRA


• Modular

- HUNTER code should not be fixed to one HRA method
- Initial efforts have centered on SPAR-H and new GOMS-HRA
- Should be able to align with other HRA methods like IDHEAS or IDAC
- Scalable
 - Features can be added in the future as they are developed
 - Features can be turned on or off depending on the granularity of analysis



New Conceptual Model


- $_{\circ}$ Three basic modules
 - Individual: What affects person performing the task (PSFs)
 - Task: What task is being performed (procedures)
 - **Environment**: What system is being used (plant model)





• HUNTER 2.0 Maps to the Original HUNTER

• Note that blue are support classes






Task Module

- Built on plant operating procedures (task = procedure step)
 - Steps mapped to GOMS-HRA task level primitives
 - Steps have input and output to environment such as controls and indicators
- Logic to handle if-then and response not obtained

ber isRno stepText		branchStep	branchProcedure	procedureExit	simulationExit	withinTarget	This is a state of the state of	Stepid subStepText isP	Point pointid	pointSource actual	alue targetValueLowe	climit targetValueU	pperLimit isPrim	itive primitiveli	d expectedOutcome notes		_
Verify Reactor Trip Oheck Turbine Trip - ALL THROT	TLE VALVES SH/T		1			TRUE							TR		reacto	e trip bypass bkrs open	_
3 PERFORM the following:		-		-		TRUE	TRUE a TRUE b	AC emergency buses - AT LEAST ONE EVENTION TR AC emergency buses - BOTH ENERGIZED	TRUE ac_em	elepwy	_	1	1 TR	UE CE			_
4 Safety Injection - ACTUATED (B	OTH TRANS					TRUE	THOSE D	Sector previous a solution of the sector of					18	UE CE			_
5 Evaluate CAL Matrix. 6 Verify CSIPs - AU. RUNNING		-	-	-	-	TRUE								UE CE UE CE	+ +		
7 Verify RHR Pumps - ALL RUNNE 8 Safety Vijection flow - GREATER						TRUE							78	UE GE			_
9 RCS Pressure - LESS THAN 2301		1 100												UE CE	fall		-
9 TBUE GO TO Step 12. 12 Main Steam Line Isolation - ACT	TUATED	1	2		-	TRUE			-		_		TR				-
12 TRUE Perform the following						TRUE	TRUE a	Check Main Steam Line Isolation - REQUIRED*					TR	UE Op	feil ONM	CALIFIC	_
stepNumber isRno	stenText			1	-	FALS	TRUE IN	18 Main Stream Isolation in AOT created, DRN 60-10 Stee 16.		branch	ten branci	hProcedure			simulationExi	t withinTarget	-
	Verify Reactor Trip									and the second	tep brune	Trocedure	proces	arcunt	Sinderonex	TRUE	÷
	Check Turbine Trip - ALL THROTTLE VALVES SHUT										_		-			TRUE	-
	PERFORM the following:															TRUE	_
3	,															TRUE	_
4	Safety Injection - ACTUATED (BOTH TRAINS)															TRUE	
5	Evaluate EAL Matrix.												2			TRUE	-
6	Verify CSIPs - ALL RUNNING															TRUE	
	Verify RHR Pumps - ALL RUNNING										-					TRUE	
	Safety Injection flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM												1			TRUE	_
	RCS Pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG																
	GO TO Step 12.									12					TRUE		
	Main Steam Line Isolation - ACTUATED									_	-		-			_	_
	Perform the following:															TRUE	_
12 TRUE 12 TRUE										-	16		+			FALSE	_
	Check CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG												+			TRUE	-
	Verify AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH ESTABLISHED										-		-			TRUE	-
	Sequencer Load Block 9 (Manual Loading Permissive) - ACTUATED (BC	тнтв	AINS)										+			TRUE	-
	Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1.		Janes								-		-			TRUE	-
	Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation Of ESFAS Signals Us	ing At	tachment	3, "Safe	guards /	Actuatio	on Verifi	cation", While Continuing With This Procedu	ire.				1			TRUE	-
	Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555F AND 559F Using															TRUE	-
22	PRZ PORVs - SHUT															TRUE	1
	PRZ Spray Valves - SHUT						_						TRUE	_			
	PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN	PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN												TRUE	_		
	Any SG pressure - DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR CO	MPLE	TELY DEPR	ESSURI	ZED								_				_
	GO TO Step 27.										27		-			TRUE	_
	Any SG - ABNORMAL RADIATION OR UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE										_		-			TRUE	_
	Check Feed Flow To Ruptured SG(s) - ISOLATED			_	_	_	_		_		-		-		-	TRUE	-
29	GO TO E-3, "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE", Step 1.										EOP-3		T	RUE	TRUE	TRUE	r




- Not all PSFs lend themselves to dynamic assignment, but may have trigger points (e.g., upset event at plant)
- Even manually triggered PSFs may have lag and linger effects

		Qualification Function			
		Manually Assigned Automatically Assigned			
Quantification	Static	The level of the PSF and its multiplier are manually assigned in the model, equivalent to static HRA.	The level of the PSF is automatically assigned, and static (i.e., predefined) multipliers are applied for each level.		
Function	Dynamic	The level of the PSF is manually assigned, but the multiplier is automatically calculated (e.g., adjusted for lag and linger effects).	The level of the PSF is automatically assigned and the PSF multiplier is autocalculated.		



Environment Module


- HUNTER represents a virtual operator who must interact with a virtual world
- Current focus has been on coupling HUNTER with RELAP5-3D thermalhydraulics
- Tight coupling means operator action triggers change in model and operator responds to changes in plant parameters





Graphical User Interface

 Python-based code that integrates various parts of HUNTER



Function



Sample HUNTER Outputs



• Modeled Steam Generator Tube Rupture


- Example scenario well documented in HRA (e.g., International HRA Empirical Study, NUREG/IA-0216)
- Scenario frequently run in INL's simulator with available log parameters for validation
- Example presented here is from NUREG/IA-0216
 - Focus on modeling simple (HFE-1A) and complex (HFE-1B) identification and isolation of ruptured steam generator

HFE	Descriptions	Base case	Complex case
HFE-1	Failure to identify and isolate the ruptured SG	HFE-1A	HFE-1B
HFE-2	Failure to cool down the RCS expeditiously	HFE-2A	HFE-2A
HFE-3	Failure to depressurize the RCS expeditiously	HFE-3A	HFE-3B
HFE-4	Failure to stop the safety injection (SI)	HFE-4A	N/A
HFE-5	Failure to give a closing order to the PORV block valve	N/A	HFE-5B1 HFE-5B2



• Modeled Steam Generator Tube Rupture

 $_{\circ}$ $\,$ Time for simple and complex scenarios



	Mean Time (s)							
	Basic	Complex						
NUREG/IA-0216	370	894						
HUNTER	391	951	×2.416 Time					



Next Steps



Future Developments in HUNTER

- Task Module
 - Auto parsing of PDF procedures to populate more scenarios
 - Building decision-making module using cognitive modeling
 - Building continuous actions

Individual Module

- More PSFs modeled
- Expanding PSFs with effects for both time and error

Environment Module

- Coupling HUNTER with additional external codes
 - Rancor Microworld Simulator
 - GSE Systems Generic Pressurized Water Reactor (GPWR)

Other

- Population of greater number of scenarios
 - HRA for novel applications like design and procedure verification and first-of-a-kind steam extraction
 - Reusable scenarios to benefit industry
- Consideration of other HRA methods beyond underlying SPAR-H
 - IDHEAS? Phoenix? Petro-HRA?



- What modeling scenarios are not currently being covered that we can use for demonstrations?
 - We are not trying to replace static HRA—just enhance it where it makes sense
- What analysis outputs other than HEPs are needed?
- What software does HUNTER need to integrate with to be useful?
 - Simulators?
 - PRA software?



Questions?

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