Control Logic Encoding using RS ModelBuilder

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RISK SPECTRUM

Building fault trees for a PSA model





Building fault trees for a PSA model





Building fault trees for a PSA model





Encapsulate and reuse expert knowledge





Models close to the design

- Knowledge separation
- Laymen can build models
- Tailored safety analysis applications
- A closer link between the plant and the safety model (digital twin)





RiskSpectrum ModelBuilder (KB3)







Solvers

Fault trees (RiskSpectrum PSA)

Monte Carlo simulation (YAMS)



Knowledge base – Figaro (a component library)

Knowledge Base Definition (Fragments)

```
CLASS prod_system EXTENDS power_source ;

INTERFACE

rep KIND repair_crew CARDINAL 0 TO 1;

CONSTANT

fail_rate DOMAIN REAL DEFAULT 1e-3 ROLE DESIGN;

rep_rate DOMAIN REAL DEFAULT 5E-2 ROLE DESIGN;

fail_start_prob DOMAIN REAL DEFAULT 1E-2 ROLE DESIGN;

ATTRIBUTE

state DOMAIN 'producing' 'standby' 'under repair' 'failed' 'required' DEFAULT 'producing';
```

```
rank DOMAIN INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
```

```
prod4
STEP default_step
GROUP Simu_group
IF request AND state = 'standby'
THEN state <-- 'required', request <-- FALSE;
FAULT fail DIST EXP(fail_rate)
INDUCING state <-- 'failed',</pre>
```





Control Logic Modeling

Examples from real-life models

- Instrumentation & Control: intelligent voting
- Spent Fuel Pool: water level and temperature control
- Heterogenous power production: resource scheduling

• We present the control logic and how it can be encoded in a knowledge base.



I&C: Intelligent Voting

- Detectable failures
- Modified voting logic





I&C: Intelligent Voting

A component class for a voting system

- Modeling:
 - Drag and drop the component to the model scheme.
 - Drag and drop detector components.
 - Connect the voting component to detectors.
- Automatic fault tree generation will include intelligent voting.



```
(* All detectors functioning - original voting *)
IF NOT (THERE EXISTS detector INCLUDED IN linked detectors
        SUCH THAT detectable failure(detector))
  AND NOT (THERE EXISTS AT LEAST detectors required all OK(voting system)
            detector INCLUDED IN linked detectors
            SUCH THAT NOT critical failure (detector))
THEN
   voting system loss ;
(* One detector defect - degraded voting defined in the voting system *)
IF (THERE EXISTS detector INCLUDED IN linked detectors
        SUCH THAT detectable failure (detector) AND
            FOR ALL other detector INCLUDED IN linked detectors
            SUCH THAT other detector <> detector WE HAVE
            NOT (detectable failure (other detector)) )
  AND NOT (THERE EXISTS AT LEAST detectors required one failed (voting system)
            detector INCLUDED IN linked detectors
            SUCH THAT NOT critical failure (detector))
THEN
   voting system loss ;
```



Reactor Water System (RW)

- A hybrid analysis discrete failures together with continuous variables
- Solved by Monte Carlo simulations
- Time discretization: clock ticks
- Discrete events can occur also between ticks



Control System for RW

- Event-driven
 - Failures, repairs
 - Clock
- State evaluation
- Decisions
- Commands to other components (RW)





Plant state update

```
(* A simple linear approximation of the heat exchange *)
IF last event date <> CURRENT DATE
THEN T <-- MIN(T + (heat(spent fuel) - heat removal(cooling)) *
           (CURRENT DATE - last event date), 100 );
(* If the water is boiling since the last event then update the water level *)
IF water boiling = TRUE AND T = 100 AND last event date <> CURRENT DATE
THEN L <-- MAX(L - boil off factor * (CURRENT DATE - last event date), 0);
(* RW system is filling the pool with water if running *)
IF state (RW) = 'RUNNING' AND last event date <> CURRENT DATE
THEN L <-- MIN( L + flow rate(RW) * (CURRENT DATE - last event date), L MAX );
IF T = 100
THEN water boiling <-- TRUE
ELSE water boiling <-- FALSE;</pre>
```



Control of RW

- The control component can check and set the state of RW.
- State: 'required'
- Actual start is handled by RW with corresponding failure modes.

```
(* Send a start signal to the RW system if the
temperature reaches the critical level*)
IF T(pool) >= T_critical AND state(RW) = 'STAND_BY'
THEN state(RW) <-- 'REQUIRED';</pre>
```

```
(* Stop the RW system if the temperature is OK
and the pool is full *)
IF T(pool) <= T_normal AND L(pool) = L_MAX(pool)
AND state(RW) = 'RUNNING'
THEN state(RW) <-- 'STAND BY';</pre>
```



A heterogenous power plant

- Consumer: a variable demand
- Renewables: wind, photovoltaic
- Gas turbine back-up
- A repair policy





A control flow chart for production scheduling

- Event driven:
 - Changing demand
 - Changing production
 - Failures/repairs
- Gas turbines started only if needed
- Variable set-point





Control station: starting and stopping gas turbines

- Power of first order quantifiers:
 - One set of rules
 - Any number of gas turbines
- Communication:
 - Sending start requests
 - Setting the production point
 - Switching off (directly)



```
(* when the output drops too much then try to increase production
from running backups *)
station0
STEP request backups GROUP Simu group
GIVEN x A backups
IF current_output ...
(* when the output drops too much then start one backup *)
stationl
STEP request backups GROUP Simu group
GIVEN x A backups
IF current output + expected new < demand AND state(x) = 'standby'
THEN state(x) <-- 'required', (* Raises an ocurrence for start-up *)
requested_output(x) <--MIN(maximal_output(x), (demand - (current_output + expected_new))),
expected new <-- expected new + requested output(x);
(* when output from renewables is sufficient then switch off a backup*)
station2
STEP decrease_backups GROUP Simu_group
GIVEN x A backups
IF current output - current output(x) \geq demand AND state(x) = 'producing'
THEN state(x) <-- 'standby',
current_output <-- current_output - current_output(x);</pre>
. . .
```

A state machine for each power producing component





Gas turbine: production determined locally

- Depending on the state
 - A local property
- Requested output
 - Set by the control logic
- Maximal output
 - A local property

```
CLASS gas_turbine EXTENDS prod_system;
ATTRIBUTE
requested_output DOMAIN REAL DEFAULT 10;
state DEFAULT 'standby';
INTERACTION
(* If a gas turbine produces it will provide requested but not more than its maximum *)
gasl
STEP default_step decrease_backups GROUP Simu_group
IF state = 'producing'
THEN current_output <-- MIN( requested_output, maximal_output );
(* If a gas turbine is not producing, nothing is provided *)
gas2
STEP default_step decrease_backups GROUP Simu_group
IF NOT(state = 'producing')
THEN current_output <-- 0;</pre>
```



Failure modeling

- A standard failure mechanism in Figaro
 - A failure time distribution
 - Effects of a failure
- Different failure modes
- Repair modeling
 - FIFO per repair crew





Heterogenous Power Production: Simulation Results

Distribution of time (hours) with a specific production level (MW)





Conclusions

Control Logic Modeling in RiskSpectrum ModelBuilder

- Model-Based Safety Assessment
- Figaro a generic and powerful modeling language
- Can incorporate various features for control logic modeling
 - Variable number of 'related' components
 - State machines
 - Flow charts
 - Time discretization for continuous variables
- Applicable to both fault tree generation and simulations

