Accountability of Dynamic Calculations

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RISK SPECTRUM

- Different from previous talks
- Exhaustive risk assessment
- Dynamic vs static



Example: a simple pumping system





A fault tree capturing failure combinations





A fault tree capturing failure combinations



• Freq x Prob₁ x Prob₂

A fault tree capturing failure combinations



- Freq x Prob₁ x Prob₂
- Failures in operation:
 - Failure rate
 - Mission time
- Meaning:



Minimal cut set list and the top failure frequency

- Validation, explanation, interpretation of quantitative results
 - Clear meaning of minimal cut sets
 - Simple mathematical connection to minimal cut set frequencies

op Event neglency r = 4,000E'04										
No	Probability	%	Event 1	Event 2	Event 3	Event 4				
1	1,45E-04	29,01	IE-S-TRANS	CCF-CCW-PMA-ALL						
2	1,45E-04	29,01	IE-S-TRANS	CCF-SWS-PMA-ALL						
3	6,04E-05	12,09	!IE-LMFW	CCF-SWS-PMA-ALL						
4	6,04E-05	12,09	!IE-LMFW	CCF-CCW-PMA-ALL						
5	5,01E-06	01,00	!IE-LMFW	CCF-RHR-PMD-ALL	FEED&BLEED					
6	4,23E-06	00,85	IE-LOOP	ACP-GT01-A	CCF-RHR-PMD-ALL					
7	3,63E-06	00,73	IE-LOOP	ACP-GT01-A	CCF-ACP-DGA-ALL					
8	2,87E-06	00,57	!IE-LMFW	CCF-EFW-PMD-ALL	DPS-MANH					
9	2,47E-06	00,49	IE-S-TRANS	CCF-ACP-DGA-ALL	OFFSITE-POWER					

Top Event frequency F = 4,999E-04



Dynamic Calculations

Repairs, cold stand-by redundancies



- Pumps can be repaired.
- Pump₂ is a cold stand-by for Pump₁.
- Event sequences instead of failure combinations
- Formalisms:
 - Dynamic Fault Trees
 - Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes
 - Stochastic Petri Nets
 - Fault Trees with repairs



Dynamic Calculations

SPECTRU

A stochastic process captures failure sequences



• Failures in operation:

- Failure rate
- Safe-end state (E.g., a repair of the initiator)
- Mean Time To Repair
- Meaning:



Analysis possibilities

SPECTRUM



• A Continuous Time Markov Chain



MCS-based methods

Accountability of Dynamic Analysis Results

Can we achieve a similar level as for static analyses?



Minimal Cut Set Based Methods

I&AB, Bounded Repairs, SDFT

Decomposition into minimal cut sets



[Initiator, Pump_1_Operation, Pump_2_Operation] [Initiator, Pump_1_Operation, Pump_2_Start] [Initiator, Pump_1_Start, Pump_2_Operation] [Initiator, Pump_1_Start, Pump_2_Start]



Minimal Cut Set Based Methods

I&AB, Bounded Repairs, SDFT

• Decomposition into minimal cut sets



• Dynamic treatment of cut sets

[Initiator, Pump_1_Operation, Pump_2_Operation]





Minimal Cut Set Based Methods

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Approximation 1: Repairs Only

Initiator and All Barriers (I&AB)

- An (approximate) analytic solution for a CTMC which models repairs
- Applied to minimal cut sets





Approximation 2: Triggers and Repairs

Bounded repairs

SPECTRUM

Only X repairs considered -> Acyclic Markov Chain



Accountability of Dynamic Analysis Results

Can we achieve a similar level as for static analyses?

No	Probability	%	Event 1	Event 2	Event 3	Event 4	Event 5
1	2,54E-09	18,77	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_LONG_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
2	2,54E-09	18,77	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_LONG_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
3	2,20E-09	16,29	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	CCF_DG_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF	
4	1,63E-09	12,04	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_LONG_FAILF	DGB_LONG_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
5	1,44E-09	10,68	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
6	3,69E-10	02,73	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_LONG_FAILF	ONDEMHOUSE_FAILI	TAC_FAILF
7	3,69E-10	02,73	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_LONG_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	ONDEMHOUSE_FAILI	TAC_FAILF
8	3,10E-10	02,29	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	CCF_DG_FAILF	ONDEMHOUSE_FAILI	TAC_FAILF	
9	2,26E-10	01,67	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_LONG_FAILF	DGB_LONG_FAILF	ONDEMHOUSE_FAILI	TAC_FAILF
10	2,23E-10	01,65	CCF_GEV_LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	ONDEMHOUSE_FAILI	TAC_FAILF
11	8,25E-11	00,61	GRID_INIT	CCF_DG_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF	
12	5,67E-11	00,42	GRID_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
13	3,49E-11	00,26	SUBSTATION_INIT	CCF_DG_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF	

Top Event frequency I&AB = 1,352E-08



Local assessments

Interpreting an effect of repairs

IE, DGA_LONG, DGB_SHORT, INFNHOUSE, TAC

- Does it matter at all?
- Importance/sensitivity for repairs of individual events and all events together

	No repair	%	Half MTTR	%
DGA_LONG	3.70E-9	145	2.54E-9	0
DGB_SHORT	5.89E-9	232	2.54E-9	0
BOTH	6.18E-9	243	2.54E-9	0

I&AB: 2.54E-9



Static: 5.68E-9

Global assessments

- Effect of repairs on the contribution and position in the MCS list
 - Static:

Top Event frequency F = 1,768E-06

No	Probability	%	Event 1	Event 2	Event 3	Event 4	Event 5
1	3,94E-07	22,28	LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
2	3,94E-07	22,28	GEV_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF

- I&AB:

Top Eve	Top Event frequency I&AB = 1,352E-08									
No	Probability	%	Event 1	Event 2	Event 3	Event 4	Event 5			
•										
•										
-										
22	1,93E-11	00,14	GEV_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF			
23	1,93E-11	00,14	LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF			



Global assessments

- Effect of repairs on the contribution and position in the MCS list
 - I&AB original:

22	1,93E-11	00,14	GEV_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
23	1,93E-11	00,14	LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF

- I&AB, MTTR of DGA_SHORT_FAILF and DGB_SHORT_FAILF is 1000 (instead of 5):

48	4,38E-11	00,07	GEV_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
49	4,38E-11	00,07	LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT_FAILF	DGB_SHORT_FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF

- I&AB, MTTR of GEV_INIT and LGR_INIT is 50 (instead of 5):

	-	-	-	-	-	-	_		-	-
7	3,06E-09	05,95	LGR_INIT	DGA_SHORT	_FAILF	DGB_S	SHORT_	FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF
8	3,06E-09	05,95	GEV_INIT	DGA_SHORT	_FAILF	DGB_S	SHORT_	FAILF	INFNHOUSE_FAILF	TAC_FAILF



Trace-based evidence

- Each cut set can be split into event sequences.
- We get an 'event sequence list' for a cut set sorted by contribution to the cut set value.

[IE, PUMP1_F, PUMP2_F, PUMP3_D]



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[IE, PUMP1_F, PUMP2_F, PUMP3_D]





Conclusions

Dynamic calculations can be as accountable as static ones

• Setup:

- Fault trees with repairs and cold stand-by redundancies
- Minimal cut set decomposition
- Dynamic quantification of minimal cut sets
- Effects of dynamic features on cut set value, contribution and position in the list
- Event sequences
 - Easily understandable sequences of failures/repairs
 - Can be quantified
 - Bounded repairs: a complete list can be presented.

